Below is a discussion about whether, in today’s climate, politics is about control over information flowing through networks. I will be discussing this in relation to WikiLeaks.
Source: "News That Matters"
Throughout history, it has been maintained that the control of information accessible to the general population is integral in the maintenance of political power. In today’s net-savvy society, anyone with an Internet connection is able to instantaneously reproduce and disseminate large amounts of information across the globe (Schwarz 2011 p1; Solove 2007 p23; Lovink et al 2010). This newly developed ability blurs the distinction between the on-field professional journalist and the at-home, blog-happy reporter (Solove 2007 p 23). In his book, An Army of Davids, Glenn Reynolds (also the author of respected political blog Instapundit) posits that the current blog-boom has resulted in a questionable shift in power (Solove 2007 p23). Reynolds stated that the “power [that was] once concentrated in the hands of a professional few has been redistributed into the hands of the amateur many” (Solove 2007 p23). This essay uses Julian Assange’s WikiLeaks to exemplify the complexities surrounding the debate about whether or not all information should be able to flow freely through networks. On the one hand, such a free-flow of information could “enhanc[e] our freedom” (Solove 2007 p17) and promote honesty within politics. On the other hand, uprooting and spreading facts to the (generally) uninformed wider population may trigger ‘the sky is falling’ scenarios, which are largely detrimental to the smooth functioning of society (Lovink et al 2010 p3; Schwarz 2011 p1). This essay will conclude by putting aside the question of ‘should’ or ‘should not’, and address the question of whether there is, realistically, anything anyone can do about the situation, given rapidly (and inevitably) spawning nature of the Internet.
Control over information is in no way a new political tactic in the maintenance of power. There was political unease surrounding the invention of the printing press in the West, as it “revolutionised the distribution of information” (Solove 2007 p18). At that time, the monarchs and popes reacted by implementing bans and licensing laws in an attempt to clog this new flow of information (Schwarz 2011 p1). Although there have been many examples in the meantime, WikiLeaks seems to be the most current (and extreme) example of political unease due to lessened control over information distribution (Schwarz 2011 p1). Julian Assange created a network in which over 250,000 State Department cables, mainly regarding the goings-on in Iraq and Afghanistan, were leaked and thus made easily accessible to anyone with the Internet (Hayes 2010 p3; Cockburn 2010 p9). The reaction to these leaks by governments around the world is akin to the reaction of monarchs and popes back in the 1500s. The Obama administration embarked on a frantic search for any form of legal justification to prosecute Assange and his operators, and wipe the WikiLeaks network from the Internet (Schwarz 2011 p1). Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell and Vice President Joseph Biden simultaneously labelled Assange as a “high-tech terrorist” (Sullum 2011 p10). And Assange was indeed dealt with as though he was a terrorist. The US branded him as an “enemy of the state” (Hayes 2010 p3), and tried to silence him by any means (Caddick 2010 p2). There were talks of possible assassinations, and Assange, in an article he wrote for The Australian newspaper, said that he received threats that his son would be kidnapped and harmed as a result of the leaks (Assange 2010). In light of the reaction by government departments globally (the Obama administration in particular), it is clear that politics relies heavily on the control over information flowing through networks, and any threat to this control is handled with brute force.
Source: The Australian
The flow of information through networks such as WikiLeaks takes a fairly sizable slice of power from political leaders’ plates. This shift in power can be viewed as a positive, as it keeps the general population in the loop regarding global affairs, and thus promotes honesty within politics. When Assange set out to develop WikiLeaks, his primary goal was to “bring greater truth” to interactions within governments (Caddick 2010 p2). Assange used the Internet as a medium to (re)distribute this “greater truth” to the masses (Caddick 2010 p2). Himself and his operators utilised this relatively new technology to its full potential, and in the age of always-accessible Internet and smart phones, WikiLeaks met (if not exceeded) its original goal. Within this network, Assange described his role as a “scientific journalist” – a reporter who provides “raw data” to readers, and thereby allows them to form their own, un-tampered-with opinion (Caddick 2010 p2). By leaking government cables, and making them widely accessible, he provided the world with a preview of what really goes on behind closed doors (Caddick 2010 p2). Rather than merely hearing the scripted words uttered in a presidential speech, or the repetitive chitchat exchanged during Question Time, the world was finally hearing the unadulterated, uncensored, un-PC words and thoughts of politicians under the pump (Cockburn 2010 p9). Assange believed that by exposing these words and thoughts through the media (which he, despite much contention, claims to be a part of), he was not only encouraging those involved in politics to play fair, but also made a stand on behalf of the general population. He believed that members of a democratic society should not be belittled by political trickery, and then expected to turn around and pay taxes (Assange 2010). Aside from the fact that secrecy in the Internet age is a costly endeavour (Schwarz 2011 p1), Assange believed that members of society have the right to know the goings-on of the political parties that they elected (or didn’t elect) into power. As was uttered in the Pentagon Papers case in front of the US Supreme Court, “only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government” (Assange, 2010). In light of the aforementioned ideas, it is little wonder why Julian Assange’s WikiLeaks, and the Internet as a whole, was nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize in 2011 (Ulanoff 2011).
The flow of information through WikiLeaks (and mirror networks) may, from a contrary vantage point, may have a debilitating effect, rather than a freeing effect on society. In her article WikiLeaks: Power and the Network, Alison Caddick stresses that the general population needs interpreted data, rather than raw data (Caddick 2010 P2). The raw data presented on WikiLeaks are merely large chunks of information begging for contextualisation. Due to the fragmented nature of the Internet, leaked cables tend to float around cyberspace, and are therefore subject to misinterpretation. This is particularly hazardous in today’s fragile post 9/11, post Global Financial Crisis state, when it is so easy to blame political leaders for unease. Caddick states that WikiLeaks, and other such government-information-divulging networks “will combine with a growing sentiment that ‘power’ in general must be taken down” (Caddick 2010 p2). Seeing as WikiLeaks mainly attracts “wildly enthusiastic, but generally passive supporters” (Lovink et al 2010 p4), is it easy to imagine this hysterical, stick-it-to-the-man attitude presenting itself. An example of significant cables being taken out of context and therefore misunderstood, are the ones surrounding the Australian and American government’s anxiety about China’s rising political, economical and environmental power (Caddick 2010 p2). These cables portray the Australian government as “pathetic[ally] subservien[t]” to America, and as completely integrated within the US military and intelligence, but fail to give a back-story (Caddick 2010 p2). The reason why the Australian government may be feeling unease in the face of China’s potential rise of power, and why they may be closely involved if not embedded within the American military is completely detached from the “raw data” available in networks such as WikiLeaks. Furthermore, Frederick A. O. Schwarz from the National Law Journal predicts that the flow of this fragmented information may result in other nations being reluctant to negotiate with the Australian government “on matters of diplomacy and national security” (Schwarz 2011 p1). In this sense, it can be understood and appreciated why those with political power control information flowing through networks and into the minds of the “idiotic masses” (Lovink et al p4).
This essay posited that control over information flowing through networks is integral to maintaining political power. This notion was exemplified using Julian Assange’s WikiLeaks, and both the positives and negatives of such a free network were discussed. Whilst both sides of the spectrum – the complete control of information distribution by political leaders, and the easy-access of information by the general population – can be appreciated, the debate as to which side is right is actually quite redundant. Due to the structure of the Internet, shutting down a network like WikiLeaks is pointless. Once distribution of information on one WikiLeaks-esque network is suspended, thousands of mirror networks pop up in its place (Dvorak 2011). Instead of hysterically trying to cull networks that divulge confidential information, political leaders should accept the inevitable process of the Internet, and maintain their power in other, more realistic ways. One such way, as Dvorak put forth in his article WikiLeaks Tests the Internet, would be for the government to brand the leaks as “unimportant gossip” that is “out of context” (Dvorak 2011). That way, as Dvorak points out, WikiLeaks and other such networks would have “die[d] a natural Internet death by neglect or disinterest” (Dvorak 2011).
Source: The Australian
Bibliography
Assange, J., 2010. Don’t Shoot the Messenger for Revealing Uncomfortable Truths. The Australian. Available online at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/in-depth/wikileaks/dont-shoot-messenger-for-revealing-uncomfortable-truths/story-fn775xjq-1225967241332 accessed 03/04/2011.
Caddick, A., 2010. WikiLeaks: Power and the Network. Arena Magazine 109:2-3.
Cockburn, A., 2010. Lessons From WikiLeaks. Nation 291(26):9.
Dvorak, J., C., 2010. WikiLeaks Tests the Internet. PC Magazine Online. Available online at http://find.galegroup.com.ezp.lib.unimelb.edu.au/gtx/infomark.do?&contentSet=IAC-Documents&type=retrieve&tabID=T003&prodId=EAIM&docId=A243800269&source=gale&srcprod=EAIM&userGroupName=unimelb&version=1.0 accessed 02/04/2011.
Hayes, C., 2010. In Defense of WikiLeaks. Nation 291(26):3.
Lovink, G,; Riemens, P., 2010. Twelve Theses on WikiLeaks. Eurozine. Available online at http://eurozine.com/pdf/2010-12-07-lovinkriemens-en.pdf accessed 02/04/2011.
Miller, R, 2011. Is WikiLeaks ‘The Press’? EContentMag 34(2):15.
Schwarz, F. A. O, 2011. A Broader Perspective on WikiLeaks. The National Law Journal. Available online at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202484174789&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1 accessed 03/04/2011.
Solove, D., J., 2007. How the Free Flow of Information Liberates and Constrains Us. The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumour and Privacy on the Internet. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 17-49.
Sullum, J., 2011. Is Julian Assange a journalist? Reason Magazine 42(11):10.
Ulanoff, L., 2011. WikiLeaks and the Internet Nominated for 2011 Nobel Peace Prize. PC Magazine. Available online at http://find.galegroup.com.ezp.lib.unimelb.edu.au/gtx/infomark.do?&contentSet=IAC-Documents&type=retrieve&tabID=T003&prodId=EAIM&docId=A250325995&source=gale&srcprod=EAIM&userGroupName=unimelb&version=1.0 Accessed 02/04/2011.
Tags: Control, Julian Assange, WikiLeaks